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Abstract 
 
Inspired by the recently concluded litigation seeking to deport the radical Islamic preacher 
Abu Qatada from the UK to Jordan, this paper aims at examining the 2012 judgment of the 
ECtHR by focusing on the question under which circumstances a deportation with diplomatic 
assurances (DWA) may be permissible under the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
Relevant background information will be provided concerning the interplay of the use of the 
DWA policy and the European Convention on Human Rights as well as concerning the 
particular circumstances that led to the ECtHR’s ruling in Abu Qatada. In the following 
analysis of the judgment, the focus will be on the interplay of the DWA policy and the 
European Convention on Human Rights with special regard to art 3 and art 6 of the 
Convention. Finally, the impact of this judgment on the future jurisprudence and the DWA 
policy will be shown.  
 
In the light of this judgment, it will be argued that the counter terrorism means of deporting a 
non-national terrorist suspect with diplomatic assurances seems to be compatible with the 
Convention if the diplomatic assurances given guarantee a sufficient protection of the human 
rights of the transferee, which due to the uncertain effects of the DWA policy, still has to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 
Word length 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises 8234 words.  
 
 
Subjects and topics 
 
Counterterrorism Law 
Deportation with diplomatic assurances 
European Convention on Human Rights (Prohibition of torture, Right to a fair trial) 
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I Introduction 
 
“We need to stop the abuse of human rights law. The Brighton Conference […] will examine 
how to reform the European Court.”1 
 
This oral statement was made by the British Home Secretary Theresa May to Parliament in 
the wake of the 2012 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Abu 
Qatada v the UK2, not only underlining the strong frustration of the British government 
concerning that ruling, but also calling into question the legitimacy of the ECtHR. 
 
The judgment referred to concerned the deportation of the non-national terrorist suspect Abu 
Qatada3 from the UK to Jordan on the basis of diplomatic assurances against torture and other 
human rights violations. The ECtHR found that his deportation would not be compatible with 
the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)4, namely with art 6 of the 
Convention. With this judgment, the Court established a new, unprecedented ground upon 
which a deportation is blocked in this field of national security. 
 
The British government strongly criticised this judgment and more generally the burden the 
Convention poses on its national security decisions. Demanding for greater deference of the 
ECtHR to national security decisions,5 they initiated the Brighton Conference where the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe considered the future of the ECtHR.6 
Furthermore, in this context, a discussion arose even about the question if the UK should 
withdraw from the Convention,7 an option which the British Home Secretary acknowledged 
to be worth considering.8 
 
In the end, after the UK had finally been able to deport Abu Qatada on the grounds of further 
assurances from Jordan, it was the same British Home Secretary who stated she was 
“immensely proud” that the UK was able to deport Abu Qatada in line with the Convention 
and the aforementioned ECtHR’s ruling.9 
 
Inspired by these recently expressed controversial views on the role of the Convention and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in national security matters, this paper aims at examining the 
2012’s judgment of the ECtHR in Abu Qatada v the UK by focusing on the question under 
which circumstances a deportation with diplomatic assurances (DWA) may be permissible 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
                                                             
1 (17 April 2012) 543 UKPD (HC) 174. 
2 Othman (Abu Qatada) v The United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1 (Section IV, ECHR) (Abu Qatada v the UK). 
3 His real name is Omar Mahmoud Mohammed Othman. 
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1950] COETS 1 (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953).  
5 See Harlan Grant Cohen “International Law’s Erie Moment“ (2013) 34 Mich J Int’l L 249 at 288.  
6 Result: Brighton Declaration (20 April 2012), in which the principle of subsidiarity of the ECtHR is 
highlighted, see paras 3 and 12 of the Declaration, available at <wcd.coe.int>.  
7 See Harlan Grant Cohen, above n 5, at 287. 
8 See (8 July 2013) 566 UKPD (HC) 24. 
9 (8 July 2013) 566 UKPD (HC) 23. 
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In parts II and III, relevant background information will be provided concerning the interplay 
of the use of the DWA policy and the European Convention on Human Rights. On this basis, 
the aforementioned ECtHR’s judgment will be examined in part IV. After having outlined the 
particular circumstances that led to the ECtHR’s ruling of Abu Qatada, I will critically 
analyse the findings of the Court with special regard to the rulings on art 3 and art 6 of the 
Convention. In part V, the impact of this judgment on the future jurisprudence and the DWA 
policy will be shown. Finally, a general conclusion will be drawn (VI). 
 
II Policy of Deporting Non-National Terrorist Suspects with Diplomatic 
Assurances  
 
A Characteristics of the DWA Policy 
 
The policy of deporting non-national terrorist suspects with diplomatic assurances (DWA 
policy) is one of the current approaches of European Council member states that intend to 
contribute to their national security.10 They use diplomatic assurances to ensure the 
deportation of these unwanted individuals to their home country, where the practice of torture 
or other inhumane treatment is common, a circumstance which engages the human rights 
responsibility of the sending state.11  
 
In the UK, the DWA policy was highly promoted by the UK government as a means of 
treating foreign terrorist suspects12 after the Belmarsh decision of the House of Lords in 
200413, which prohibited the (indefinite) detention of non-national terrorists as being 
disproportionate and discriminatory. 
 
1 Definition of Diplomatic Assurances 
 
In the context of counter-terrorism law diplomatic assurances are described as “diplomatic 
‘promise[s]’, given by the receiving state to the sending state, that the transferee will not be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”14 and will not be treated in 
breach of other human rights obligations upon return15. Accordingly, diplomatic assurances 
are conceived as bilateral agreements between states committing the receiving state to 
observing the human rights of certain individuals after their removal to that state, particularly 
the right not to be tortured.  
 
The question is whether the diplomatic assurances constitute legally binding promises or not. 
With reference to the International Court of Justice some scholars argue that these assurances 
                                                             
10 Abu Qatada v the UK, above n 2, at [184; 186]. 
11 See [185].  
12 See Clive Walker “The Treatment of Foreign Terror Suspects” (2007) 70 Mod L Rev 427 at 432 et seq. 
13 A (FC) and Others (FC) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 WLR 
87 (Belmarsh).  
14 Frank Seier “Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture: Impermissible Inter Se Modifications of Erga Omnes 
Obligations” (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2008) at 1. 
15 Jennifer Tooze “Deportation with Assurances: the Approach of the UK Courts” [2010] P.L. 362 at 376. 
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form international treaties or at least an “international equivalent of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel”16 since they presume an intention of the states to create legally binding 
obligations.17 However, the majority of the scholars argue in line with the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights that diplomatic assurances form mere promises from the 
receiving state, since they are created on a diplomatic level, and are therefore not legally 
binding.18 The latter view is convincing since diplomatic assurances are labelled as a 
“diplomatic” means and therefore require no act of transformation into domestic law as 
international treaties normally do. Thus, they cannot be presumed to express the intention of 
the states to create legally binding obligations.19 Therefore, they merely constitute non-legally 
binding bilateral agreements, which are consequently legally not enforceable. 
 
2 Classification of Diplomatic Assurances 
 
Diplomatic assurances vary from simple oral promises to written documents.20 According to 
the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in the Hague, on a written basis, three main 
types of diplomatic assurances can be found, namely diplomatic notes, exchange of letters and 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), which are classified as being either “hard” or “soft” 
depending on whether enforcement mechanisms are provided for by the diplomatic assurances 
or not.21 Whereas diplomatic notes and exchanges of letters only outline promises of one state 
towards another, and may therefore only be signed by the state demanding or expressing that 
intent, a MoU must be signed by both states to form a valid agreement. 
 
“Hard” diplomatic assurances “tend to provide enforcement mechanisms […] and documents 
may be declassified”.22 Enforcement is given through concrete and detailed assurances 
whereby the receiving state promises to treat the returning person humanely, as well as 
through the establishment of practical instruments, like independent monitoring bodies, which 
force the receiving state to abide by the assurances.23 The UK’s MoU with Jordan,24 which 
became relevant in the case of Abu Qatada, must be conceived as a “hard” diplomatic 
assurance.  
 
                                                             
16 Martin Jones “Lies, Damned Lies and Diplomatic Assurances: The Misuse of Diplomatic Assurances in 
Removal Proceedings” (2006) 8 Eur J Migration L 9 at 29. 
17 Georg Noll “Diplomatic Assurances and the Silence of Human Rights Law” (2006) 7 MJIL 104 at 114. 
18 See generally Lena Skoglund “Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture – An Effective Strategy?: A Review of 
Jurisprudence and Examination of the Arguments” (2008) 77 Nordic J Int’l L 319 at 335 et seq. 
19 See e.g. view of the Jordanian government on the MoU with the UK, Omar Othman (aka Abu Qatada) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005 (26 February 2007) February 2007 at 
[180] (Abu Qatada v SSHD). 
20 Lena Skoglund, above n 18, at 334. 
21 Bibi van Ginkel and Federico Rojas “Use of Diplomatic Assurances in Terrorism-related Cases: In Search of a 
Balance Between Security Concerns and Human Rights Obligations“ (2011) ICCT <www.icct.nl> at 2. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Another enforcement mechanism can be seen in the ratification of the right of the individual to petition to the 
UN Committee Against Torture (art 22 UNCAT) in the receiving state, see Abu Qatada v the UK, above n 2, at 
[169]. 
24 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Regulating the Provision of 
Undertakings in Respect of Specified Persons Prior to Deportation (signed 10 August 2005), available at 
<www.gov.uk> (MoU UK-Jordan). 
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“Soft” diplomatic assurances “tend to lack enforcement mechanisms and are often kept 
confidential”.25 They often constitute a mere framework agreement for obtaining assurances. 
In the case of Abu Qatada, not all assurances given by the Jordanian state were included in the 
MoU due to constitutional reasons of Jordan. Thus, a “soft” diplomatic assurance was also 
given by the Jordanian government, promising that they would not use the death penalty.26  
 
B Main Problems with the DWA Policy 
 
The DWA policy is highly contested.27 Overall, the use of diplomatic assurances as a counter-
terrorism instrument has been criticised as “a political strategy of uncertain worth.”28 There 
are two main problems of the DWA policy, arising from the uncertain effect they create.  
 
1 Scepticism about the Reliance on Diplomatic Assurances 
 
The first problem is the scepticism about whether diplomatic assurances can be relied upon. 
Since they are conceived as non-legally binding agreements, it has been argued that they are 
legally not enforceable and thus do not provide for an adequate protection of the returning 
person.29 Various human rights organisations30 question the reliability of “paper promises 
from torturers”.31 Why should these diplomatic assurances be relied upon when they result 
from breaches of multilateral human rights obligations in the first place? 
 
In this context, it is noteworthy that even the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council 
of Europe stated in his “viewpoint” in 2006 that diplomatic assurances were “pledges” which 
were “not credible” and which had “turned out to be ineffective in well-documented cases”.32 
Case studies about the treatment of foreign terrorist suspects after their removal to the 
receiving state show that the odds of torture after a DWA are high.33  
 
Against this scepticism, it has been argued that it is the bilateral nature of the assurances 
which could strengthen the reliability. The promoters of diplomatic assurances underline that - 
in contrast to multilateral obligations - diplomatic assurances form “promises that the 
                                                             
25 Bibi van Ginkel and Federico Rojas, above n 21, at 2. 
26 See side letter of the British Embassy in Amman to UK’s MoU with Jordan of 10 August 2005, which - 
together with the government of Jordan’s formal response- forms an exchange of letters on the use of the death 
penalty, available at <www.gov.uk>. 
27 For an overview about the problematic issues concerning the use of diplomatic assurances in counter-terrorism 
law see generally Kate Jones “Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key Criticisms” (2008) 57 ICLQ 183. 
28 Martin Jones, above n 16, at 15. 
29 See Ben Middleton “Deporting Terrorist Suspects with Assurances: Lessons from the United Kingdom” 
(2012) 12 Conn Pub Int LJ 127 at 164 et seq. 
30 See e.g. Amnesty International “Dangerous Deals: Europe’s Reliance on ‘Diplomatic Assurances’ Against 
Torture (12 April 2010) <www.amnesty.org> or Human Rights Watch “Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No 
Safeguard Against Torture” (15 April 2005) <www.hrw.org>. 
31 Kent Roach Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011) at 288.  
32 Thomas Hammarberg “Torture can never, ever be accepted” (27 June 2006) in 2006 Viewpoints Commissioner 
for Human Rights <www.coe.int>. 
33 E.g. nearly a hundred per cent “chance” of deported persons being subjected to torture from the U.S. under the 
Bush administration until 2005, see Katherine Hawkins “The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and 
the Legality of ‘Rendition’” (2006) 20 Geo Immigr LJ 213 at 264. 
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rendition of the subjected person is without prejudice to the human rights promise of the 
multilateral treaties”34 and provide greater protection to deportees because of the more direct 
nature of the agreement.35 
 
Even if this seems possible in cases where extremely strong bilateral ties between the 
receiving and the sending state exist, the reliability on assurances given by countries which 
constantly breach multilateral human rights obligations remains a controversial issue of the 
DWA policy.  
 
2  Creation of Inequality in the Receiving State 
 
Even in the case where the diplomatic assurances are abided by in the receiving state, another 
problem arises, namely the creation of inequality in the receiving state concerning the 
different treatments of criminal suspects – the ones under the authority of a diplomatic 
assurance and those without them. That is the reason why it is controversial if or to what 
extent DWA policy states, effectively condone inequality and systemic problems in these 
countries by allowing for assurances.36  
 
Against this scepticism, governments using the DWA policy bring up the argument that their 
policy does not undermine but strengthen the goal of improving human rights standards in the 
receiving country as they increasingly address detention issues.37  
 
It has to be questioned if such a positive effect can really be achieved in the receiving state. 
Nevertheless, it would be perverse to insist on “equality of law” in the receiving state where 
the sending state has not only the possibility but also the legal obligation to insist on rights to 
the benefit of an individual, the deportee. 
 
C Legal Framework of the DWA Policy 
 
First of all, it must be noted that the power to deport stems from immigration law. For 
instance in the UK, section 3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 allows the Secretary of State 
to deport non-nationals if the deportation is conducive to the public good. 38 The risk a non-
national person poses to national security has been seen as a sufficient reason for 
deportation.39 
 
However, the policy of using DWAs is limited by legal constraints under the sending state’s 
human rights obligations both on an international and European level.40 The internationally 
acknowledged principle of non-refoulement is of particular importance in this context. It 
                                                             
34 Georg Noll, above n 17, at 123. 
35 Abu Qatada v SSHD, above n 19, at [495]. 
36 See Kate Jones, above n 27, at 193. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Immigration Act 1971 (UK), s 3(5)(a). 
39 See Jennifer Tooze, above n 15, at 364 et seq. 
40 At 366.  
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stipulates that individuals are protected against removal to a country where their lives or 
freedoms are threatened.41 On an international level, this principle can be found explicitly in 
art 33 of the Refugee Convention42 and implicitly, developed by the jurisprudence under 
general prohibitions of torture,43 e.g. under art 7 of the ICCPR44. On a European level, the 
non-refoulement principle has been developed under art 3 of the Convention.  
 
III European Convention on Human Rights as a Legal Constraint on the 
DWA Policy  
 
In how far does the Convention function as a legal constraint on the DWA policy? What is the 
scope of protection of the non-refoulement principle under the Convention?  
 
A Relevant Articles with regard to the DWA Policy 
 
Before the decision of Abu Qatada in 2012, the ECtHR has discussed the following articles in 
the context of the DWA policy, which guarantee either substantial or procedural rights:45 
 
 Art 2: Right to life 
 Art 3: Prohibition of torture 
 Art 5: Right to liberty and security 
 Art 6: Right to a fair trial 
 Art 13: Right to an effective remedy 
 Art 34: Right of individual petition  
 
First of all, it is noteworthy that art 34, the right of individual petition, forms part of section II 
(“European Court of Human Rights”) of the Convention, whereas the other rights listed above 
form part of section I (“Rights and Freedoms”) of the Convention. 
 
Under section I of the Convention, art 15 is of particular importance. According to art 15, arts 
2 and 3 of the Convention cannot be derogated from in times of emergency and are therefore 
absolute in contrast to the other rights listed above.46 Thus, these absolute rights pose a greater 
legal constraint on the DWA policy than the others do. Accordingly, the threshold of violating 
them is lower than the one of relative rights, like of arts 5 and 6. Nonetheless, according to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, these relative rights are violated in a “foreign case”47 if the 
                                                             
41 Cornelis (Kees) Wouters “Reconciling National Security and Non-Refoulement: Exceptions, Exclusion, and 
Diplomatic Assurances” in Ana Maria Salinas de Frias, Kathja LH Samuel and Nigel D White (ed) Counter-
Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 579 at 580. 
42 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137 (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention). 
43  Cornelis (Kees) Wouters, above n 14, at 580.  
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR). 
45 Based on the factsheet of the ECtHR on expulsion and extradition cases of July 2013, comprising the relevant 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR from 1989 until July 2013, available at <www.echr.coe.int>. 
46 Art 2 can exceptionally be derogated from in the case of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, see art 15 (2) 
of the Convention. 
47 Meaning a deportation case where the receiving state is not a High Contracting Party to the Convention. 
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deportation constitutes a “flagrant denial” of these individual’s Convention rights, ie “a 
complete nullification of the right[s]”.48 
 
B Analysis of the Relevant Articles 49 
 
1 Article 3 of the Convention 
 
Art 3 of the Convention provides:50 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”.  
 
On a literal reading, art 3 contains no explicit prohibition of removing a person to torture. 
However, the ECtHR held in the landmark case Soering v the United Kingdom51 in 1989 that 
article 3 is violated where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an 
extradition exposes the returning person to a real risk of torture, inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment in the receiving state.52 This principle was further developed in 
Chahal v the United Kingdom53 in which the ECtHR explicitly stated that this principle is also 
applicable with regard to deportations of foreign terrorist suspects since art 3 is absolute and 
forbids any derogation so that even national security reasons cannot be balanced against it.54 
Therefore, art 3 of the Convention renders deportations unlawful if there is a real risk of 
torture or ill-treatment. 
 
This line of reasoning has been confirmed in a number of judgments by the ECtHR until at 
present.55 In Saadi v Italy56 the court clarified that this liability of the removing state occurred 
under the Convention “by reason of its having taken action which has a direct consequence on 
the exposure of an individual to the risk of proscribed ill-treatment”.57  
 
Until its judgment in Abu Qatada v the UK in 2012, the ECtHR had been reluctant to accept 
the DWA policy and had always found this article violated, ruling in each case that the 
assurances given could not remove the real risk of torture or ill-treatment in the receiving 
state.58  
                                                             
48 See Jennifer Tooze, above n 15, at 367. 
49 Since Art 3 and 6 of the Convention were of particular importance in the decision of Abu Qatada v the UK, 
these two articles will be examined first and in more detail than the other articles.  
50 Above n 4, art 3. 
51 Soering v the United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 (ECHR) (Soering v the UK). 
52 At [91].  
53 Chahal v the United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 (ECHR) (Chahal v the UK).  
54 At [75-82]. Different view expressed in the dissenting judgment by the minority of the Court, which indicated 
that the prohibition of torture was not absolute in its “extra-territorial application”, see “Joint Partly Dissenting 
Opinion Gölcüklü, Matscher, Sir John Freeland, Baka, Mifsud, Bonnici, Gotchev and Levits” at [1].  
55 See e.g. D v the United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423 (ECHR); Mamatkulov and Askalov v Turkey (2005) 41 
EHRR 2 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) (Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey); N v Finland (2005) 43 EHRR 12 
(Section IV, ECHR). 
56 Saadi v Italy (2008) 49 EHRR 730 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [126] (Saadi v Italy). 
57 At [126].  
58 See e,g. Chahal v the UK, above n 53, at [105-107]; Baysakov and Others v Ukraine (54131/08) Section V, 
ECHR 18 February 2010 at [51]. 
12 
 
2 Article 6 of the Convention 
 
Art 6 of the Convention stipulates the right to a fair trial. Art 6 (1) provides as follows59: 
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. […] 
 
Furthermore, art 6 contains provisions protecting explicit fair trial rights in criminal 
proceedings, notably the presumption of innocence in criminal cases and other “minimum 
rights” for everyone charged with a criminal offence, including the right to have access to 
legal representation and the right to examine witnesses against himself.60  
 
Due to the right’s “prominent place in a democratic society”, the ECtHR stated in Soering v 
the United Kingdom that a breach of art 6 of the Convention was possible where the transferee 
had suffered or was at a risk of suffering a “flagrant denial of a fair trial” in the receiving 
state.61 In 2010, the ECtHR referred to this idea in Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey,62 but 
made no further (substantive) clarification on that point63, leaving its relevance for DWA-
cases uncertain until the decision of Abu Qatada v the UK. 
 
3 Other Relevant Articles of the Convention 
 
Among the other relevant articles of the Convention, art 2, the absolute right to life, is of 
particular importance. In H.N. v Sweden64 the court expressed that the principles established 
with regard to the real risk of ill-treatment under art 3 also applies in regard to art 2.65  
 
By contrast, the ECtHR expressed doubts as to the reliance on art 5 (the right to liberty and 
security) in deportation cases.66 
 
Besides, the procedural right of art 13, the right to an effective remedy, has been found as 
applicable in deportation cases.67 In A v the Netherlands68 the judges held that art 13 
guarantees the “availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the 
convention rights and freedoms”, thus for the first time providing for an arguable complaint 
under a substantive provision of the Convention, like art 3.69  
                                                             
59 Above n 4, art 6 (1).  
60 Above n 4, art 6 (2) and (3). 
61 Soering v the UK, above n 51, at [113]. 
62 Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, above n 55, at [88]. 
63 Abu Qatada v the UK, above n 2, at [284]. 
64 H.N. v Sweden (30720/09) Section V, ECHR 15 May 2012.  
65 At [36]. 
66 Tomic v the United Kingdom (17873/03) Section IV, ECHR 14 October 2003 at 12 (Tomic v the UK). 
67 See e.g. A v the Netherlands (4900/06) Section III, ECHR 20 July 2010. 
68 Ibid. 
69 At [155]. The scope of the state’s obligation under art 13 therefore varies with regard to the arguable 
complaint, see [157]. 
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The last relevant article, art 34 of the Convention, which provides for the right of individual 
petition, is violated in DWA cases where the sending state fails to comply with interim 
measures issued by the ECtHR, thus not only preventing the court from examining the 
individual’s complaint but also hindering the effective exercise of the individual’s right.70 
 
IV Judgment of the ECtHR in Abu Qatada v the UK (2012) 
 
A Principal Facts of the Case 
 
1 DWA Order for Abu Qatada 
  
Abu Qatada, a Jordanian national and radical Islamic preacher, was recognised as a refugee in 
Britain in 1994 as he had suffered from torture by the Jordanian authorities before.71 In 1999 
and 2000, he was convicted twice in absentia by the Jordanian state on the terror charge of 
conspiracy to cause explosions at different targets in Jordan, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment and 15 years imprisonment respectively. In both cases, evidence obtained by 
torture of other defendants was used.72 
 
As a noncitizen terrorist suspect involved with al Qaeda73, on 11 August 2005, the British 
Secretary of State served Abu Qatada with a DWA order for national security reasons after a 
MoU between the governments of the UK and Jordan had been signed one day before on a 
British initiative.74 
 
The MoU75 sets out several assurances of compliance with international human rights 
standards, which have to be abided by when a person is returned to one State from another, 
including in particular concrete provisions of proper humane treatment and one more abstract 
provision of the right to a fair trial.76 Furthermore, the MoU provides for the right of a 
returning person to contact regularly an independent body in the receiving state which has 
been nominated by the UK and the Jordanian government.77 On this basis, the two 
governments agreed on the Adaleh Centre as the monitoring body.78  
 
2 National Appeals after the DWA Order 
 
Abu Qatada appealed against his deportation order to the Special Immigration Appeal 
Commission (SIAC), arguing that this decision was incompatible with the Convention, 
namely with art 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention. Concerning art 3 he stated that a breach was 
inherent in the deportation order as he was at a real risk of torture once he would be back in 
                                                             
70 See e.g. Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, above n 55, at [128]. 
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Jordan; concerning art 6 he submitted inter alia that his deportation to Jordan would pose him 
at a real risk that torture evidence would be used in his retrial, infringing his right to a fair 
trial.79 
 
SIAC dismissed the appeal of Abu Qatada.  As to the complaints under art 3 of the 
Convention they considered that although the risk of torture for an “ordinary Islamist 
extremist” was real in Jordan, the MoU between the UK and Jordan and the monitoring 
agreement would give sufficient protection for Abu Qatada from being subjected to torture in 
Jordan.80 With regard to his complaints under art 6 of the Convention they held that there 
would be no flagrant denial of justice even if there was a real risk of the admission of torture 
evidence in his retrial.81  
 
The Court of Appeal agreed on SIAC’s findings on art 3, but overruled SIAC’s decision with 
regard to a possible breach of art 6 of the Convention. 82 Due to the high risk that torture 
evidence might be used in his retrial the court stated that explicit assurances on this point 
were required but had not been given by Jordan yet.83  
 
The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal’s findings and re-instated the original 
arguments put forward by SIAC that a deportation would not be a violation of any rights 
under the Convention.84 
 
B Ruling of the ECtHR Concerning the Interplay of the DWA Policy and the Convention 
 
Abu Qatada alleged before the ECtHR a violation of the Convention, particularly of art 3 and 
art 6 of the Convention, if he was deported to Jordan.85 On 17 January 2012, the ECtHR ruled 
that his deportation to Jordan with the particular MoU would not violate art 3 but his right to a 
fair trial under art 6 of the Convention.86 
 
1 Article 3: Prohibition of Torture 
 
(a) Concrete Reasoning 
 
(aa) Judgment of the ECtHR 
  
First of all, the court stated that a “culture of impunity” concerning “widespread and routine” 
torture was found in the Jordanian criminal system.87 Therefore, according to the judges, the 
deportation of a “high profile Islamist” like Abu Qatada to Jordan without any assurances 
                                                             
79 At [25]. 
80 At [34]. 
81 At [46]. 
82 See [48-52]. 
83 See Othman (Jordan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 290, [2008] 3 WLR 
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84 Abu Qatada v the UK, above n 2, at [53-66]. 
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from the Jordanian Government would constitute a real risk of ill-treatment and therefore be 
incompatible with art 3 of the Convention.88 The fact that Abu Qatada claimed that he had 
been tortured in former times in Jordan also constituted a relevant factor to the judges.89 
 
However, the court stated that the assurances given by the Jordanian government in the MoU 
and the agreement concerning Adaleh as a monitoring  body must  be considered  in  order  to 
answer the question if any real risk of ill-treatment of Abu Qatada could be removed.90  
 
The approach of the court contained an evaluation of both general and specific concerns about 
the MoU brought up by Abu Qatada. 
 
(aaa) General Concerns about the Reliability of the MoU 
 
The general concerns put forward by Abu Qatada question the reliability of the MoU signed 
by the Jordanian government.91 Firstly, he argued that Jordan could not be relied on abiding 
by legally non-binding diplomatic assurances since it did not even comply with legally 
binding, multilateral international agreements. Secondly, he brought up that where there was a 
systematic problem of torture and ill-treatment no assurance could ever be relied on and even 
where there was a non-systematic practice of torture and ill-treatment, assurances could only 
be relied on in cases of the establishment of an independent, effectively working monitoring 
body. 
 
The court rejected these general concerns for the reason that they could not be supported by 
ECtHR’s case-law on assurances. Instead, the judges held the following92: 
 
 If a state does not comply with its multilateral obligations, the extent to which it has 
failed to do so is at most a factor determining whether its bilateral assurances are 
sufficient 
 When there is a systematic problem of torture and ill-treatment in the receiving state, 
there is no prohibition on seeking assurances 
 The general human rights situation in Jordan does not exclude accepting any 
assurances whatsoever from the Jordanian government 
 
Furthermore, the court emphasised that assurances must be seen in their context.93 With 
regard to the MoU concluded between the UK and Jordan the judges saw the strength of the 
agreement in the following: 
 
 Specific and comprehensive94 
                                                             
88 At [192]. 
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91 See [193]. 
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 Given in good faith95   
 Capable of being binding to Jordan because of the strong bilateral ties between the UK 
and Jordan and the approval by the Jordanian King himself96 
 
 (bbb) Concrete Concerns about the Meaning and Operation of the MoU 
 
Moreover, the Court held that various concrete concerns brought up by Abu Qatada and 
dealing with the meaning and operation of the special provisions of the MoU were unlikely to 
appear.97 According to the judges, his concern about not having access to legal advice – as a 
“fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment” - during interrogation period was unwarranted 
since it was currently protected through means contained in the MoU and monitoring 
arrangements.98  In response to Abu Qatada’s concern about the capacity of the Adaleh Centre 
to monitor him the judges stated that although its capacity could not be equated to leading 
international NGOs, its subsidiary, The National Team to Combat Torture, would still provide 
for the necessary interdisciplinary expertise and sufficient staff.99 The judges added that a 
certain independence of the body, “at least from the Jordanian Government”, could be found 
as it was funded by the British government.100  
 
(ccc) Finding: No Violation of Article 3 
 
All in all, the ECtHR found that the assurances given by the Jordanian government in the 
MoU and the agreement concerning Adaleh as a monitoring body removed the real risk of ill-
treatment of Abu Qatada. Accordingly, they held that his deportation to Jordan with 
diplomatic assurance would not be in violation of art 3 of the Convention. 
 
(bb) Evaluation of the Concrete Reasoning  
 
The overall line of reasoning of the ECtHR is clear. The court underlines with its in-depth 
context-based analysis of the MoU in question the importance of having case-by-case 
decisions in order to find if a DWA is compatible with art 3 of the Convention. In the concrete 
reasoning, the factor of having an effective monitoring body to ensure that Jordan would 
abide by the concrete MoU was crucial. 
 
However, some aspects of the concrete reasoning remain unclear and controversial:  
 
Firstly, it is questionable in how far the Adaleh Centre can be really seen as an independent 
body since it is funded by the sending state, the UK. In how far can it then be an NGO? The 
Adaleh Centre might be influenced by the UK which itself is not committed to watching the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
94 At [194]. 
95 At [195]. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See [197-204]. 
98 At [199]. 
99 At [203-204]. 
100 At [203]. 
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treatment of Abu Qatada since art 3 does not involve adjudicating on the receiving country's 
compliance with the Convention.  
 
The Jordan Times reported in September 2013 that Abu Qatada’s lawyer filed a complaint at 
the Adaleh Centre as Abu Qatada’s access to legal advice was restricted.101 Therefore, it 
seems that his access to legal advice which was seen as a “fundamental safeguard against ill-
treatment” by the ECtHR is not sufficiently protected through the MoU and the monitoring 
agreements.  
 
Secondly, a very controversial aspect of the court’s concrete reasoning is its ruling that the 
system of systematical torture in Jordan does not preclude the UK government from relying 
on the agreement. Some scholars state that this aspect of the judgment appears to be 
inconsistent with the position of the UN Committee against Torture bearing in mind that 
Jordan’s practice constantly violates its obligations under various binding international 
instruments.102  
 
(b) General Principles  
 
(aa) Judgment of the ECtHR 
 
In its general approach, the court acknowledged deportation of non-national terrorist suspects 
to their home country as a legitimate means of fighting against terrorism if they pose a threat 
to the national security.103 However, if the foreign terrorist suspect faces a real risk of being 
subjected to torture in the receiving state, “article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the 
person in question to that country”.104  
 
The court stated that in order to determine the real risk consideration would have to be given 
to the general human rights situation in the receiving country as well as to the particular 
characteristics of the applicant.105 Furthermore, as a third factor, assurances should be taken 
into account when obtained from the receiving state.106 Regardless of the propriety of seeking 
assurances, the judges see their task with regard to art 3 of the Convention in examining 
“whether the assurances obtained in a particular case are sufficient to remove any real risk of 
ill-treatment”.107  
 
This proves that the court is not convinced that diplomatic assurances automatically provide 
for a sufficient protection but need scrutiny.  Thus, the ECtHR stated that they could only be 
seen as sufficient when they provide for a sufficient guarantee of protection against the risk of 
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ill-treatment in their practical applications.108 The weight to be given to these assurances 
depends on the particular circumstances of each case.109 
 
The court stated that in some “rare cases”110 “the general human rights situation in the 
receiving state excludes accepting any assurances whatsoever”.111 In all the other cases, the 
court takes a two step-assessment approach, assessing the following:112 
 
 the quality of the assurances given  
 whether, in light of the receiving State’s practices, they can be relied upon  
 
With regard to this assessment process, the court listed eleven factors, to which it would have 
regard “inter alia”.113 Some of these relevant factors are114:  
 
 the specificity of the assurance 
 the person who has given the assurance and whether that person can bind the receiving 
state 
 the form of bilateral relations between the receiving and the sending states  
 whether diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms can objectively verify that the 
receiving state will abide by the assurance  
  
(bb) Evaluation of the General Principles  
 
Overall, the general principles laid down by the court could function as a guideline for the UK 
and other countries with a DWA policy to conclude diplomatic assurances which would more 
likely withstand judicial scrutiny.115  
 
However, it remains unclear what weight should be given to the eleven factors brought up by 
the court and how they are intended to interfere with each other. Particularly in the UK, the 
concern was raised whether the ECtHR would uphold diplomatic assurances consistent with 
art 3 of the Convention where no independent monitoring arrangement has been concluded, 
since the House of Lords has ruled116 that this was possible.117 In the particular reasoning of 
Abu Qatada’s case, however, the monitoring arrangement has played an immense role for the 
ECtHR’s ruling.  
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Furthermore, as the court underlined that it would give consideration to these factors only 
“inter alia” it is likely that in other cases other factors that may not have been listed here 
become crucial, like the length of duration of the assurances with regard to the application to a 
specific person.  
 
Besides, further qualification will be needed to determine the “rare cases” in which the 
general human rights situation is so bad that no assurances can be relied upon. The statement 
that in some cases the assurances cannot be accepted to remove any real risk of torture is 
reasonable. However, the term “rare cases” is too vague and requires further explanation. I f 
Jordan’s human rights situation, which can be described as poor with regard to its high record 
of “widespread” practice of torture does not fall under this scope, what other country’s human 
rights situation does?  
2 Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial 
 
(a) Concrete Reasoning 
 
(aa) Judgment of the ECtHR 
 
Abu Qatada has alleged a breach of art 6 of the Convention, claiming that his retrial would 
amount to a flagrant denial of justice for various factors, including the absence of a lawyer in 
interrogation, the consequences of his notoriety and the composition of the State Security 
Court and the admission of torture evidence in his retrial. The court identified the factor of 
admitting the use of torture evidence in his retrial as the “central issue” with regard to a 
possible violation of art 6.118  
 
In its assessment, the court took a three-step approach119:  
 
 if there had been evidence obtained by torture against the applicant 
 whether there could be found a real risk of the admission of torture evidence 
 whether a flagrant denial of justice arose in the case where there was a real risk of the 
admission of torture evidence 
 
Whereas the court found it indisputable that in Abu Qatada’s case there had been evidence 
obtained by torture against the applicant with regard to the obtainment of the two witnesses’ 
statements against Abu Qatada, the other two factors were identified as more contestable and 
therefore examined in more depth. 
 
(aaa) Real Risk of the Admission of Torture Evidence 
 
First of all the court stated that there was no higher burden of proof for Abu Qatada so that a 
real risk of the admission of torture evidence would suffice.120 Especially the fact that it was 
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difficult to prove allegations of torture in a criminal justice system “which is complicit in the 
very practices which it exists to prevent” would make it inappropriate to demand a high 
standard of proof.121 Consequently, the court refused to apply the “balance of probabilities 
test” used by the House of Lords in Belmarsh, arguing that it was an inappropriate means.122 
 
Although the court stated that the use of torture evidence was prohibited under Jordanian law, 
it underlined its doubts about the real practical value of this legal prohibition.123 According to 
the judges, both torture in Jordan and the use of torture evidence by Jordanian courts is 
widespread.124 
 
With regard to the evidence in question, the two statements of the witnesses which were 
obtained by torture, the judges held that although Abu Qatada legally had a right to challenge 
the admissibility of the torture evidence, this would be difficult: not only because of the 
number of years passed after these events, which would hinder this right from being effective, 
but also because of the fact that the Jordanian State Security court was more likely to reject 
such a claim.125 According to the ECtHR, the Jordanian State Security Court had shown little 
readiness to use its power to carefully scrutinise potentially tainted evidence due to its “lack 
of independence” from the General Intelligence Directorate and the Public Prosecutor.126 
Therefore, a real risk of the admission of torture evidence in his retrial was given.127 
 
(bbb) Flagrant Denial of Justice  
 
According to the judges, “a flagrant denial of justice will arise when evidence obtained by 
torture is admitted in criminal proceedings”.128 With regard to the high probability that torture 
evidence would be admitted in Abu Qatada’s retrial, the ECtHR held that this real risk would 
amount to a flagrant denial of justice.129 
 
In the following, the court contrasted this finding to its judgment in Mamtkulov and Askarov v 
Turkey, where no violation of art 6 had been found. They argued that in contrast to the 
aforementioned judgment, where a complaint of a violation of art 6 was merely of a “general 
and unspecific nature”130, this time the complaint of a violation of art 6 was a “sustained and 
well-founded attack on a State Security Court system that will try him in breach of one of the 
most fundamental norms of international criminal justice, the prohibition on the use of 
evidence obtained by torture.”131 Thus, the ECtHR found that the burden of proof was met in 
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Abu Qatada’s case, demonstrating a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in case of his 
deportation to Jordan.132 
 
(ccc)  Finding: Violation of Article 6 
 
All in all, the court held that Abu Qatada’s deportation to Jordan would violate art 6 of the 
Convention because of the real risk that torture evidence would be admitted in his retrial.133  
 
(bb) Evaluation of the Concrete Reasoning 
 
The concrete reasoning of the ECtHR, with regard to its finding on art 6, is presented in a 
striking and clear manner, focused on the question if there would be a real risk of the 
admission of torture evidence in Abu Qatada’s retrial if he was deported. 
 
It should be welcomed that the ECtHR stated that the real risk of the admission of torture 
evidence in Abu Qatada’s retrial would suffice in order to proof a flagrant denial of justice 
due to its difficulties in proving allegations of torture in Jordan’s criminal system. By 
explicitly rejecting the House of Lord’s “balance of probabilities test” with regard to art 6 as 
an inappropriate means, a clear stance was taken.  
 
However, it must be criticised that the court did not comment on the role of diplomatic 
assurances in this context despite the fact, that in the present case, the MoU between Jordan 
and the UK did contain a provision concerning the right to a fair trial of returning persons.134 
Unlike with regard to art 3, the ECtHR failed to examine in its assessment concerning art 6, if 
assurances given by Jordan could remove the real risk of the admission of torture evidence.135  
 
This last evaluation can be supported by the fact that the Court of Appeal, in contrast to the 
ECtHR, did refer to the reliability on assurances in the context of art 6. The Court of Appeal 
stated that a “high degree of assurance” was required to remove the real risk that torture 
evidence would not be relied upon in a trial in the receiving state.136 However, in the Court of 
Appeal’s point of view, the assurance given by the Jordanian government could not be 
conceived as such assurances with regard to art 6.137  
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(b) General Principles 
 
(aa) Judgment of the ECtHR 
 
In its general approach with regard to art 6 of the Convention, the court outlined its general 
principles concerning the “flagrant denial of justice test” and made concrete statements why 
the admission of evidence obtained by torture amounts to a flagrant denial of justice. 
 
The court at first defined the “flagrant denial of justice test” as being “synonymous with a 
trial which is manifestly contrary to the provisions of article 6 or the principles embodied 
therein”.138 It stated that this definition might be vague and needed further determination. 
However, referring to the fact that the court itself had never found a violation of art 6 in 
deportation cases, the judges underlined the high threshold of this test as a “stringent test of 
unfairness”, which  required more than “mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial 
procedures”.139 Consequently, according to the judges, a flagrant denial of justice requires a 
breach of the fair trial principles, being so fundamental that it amounts to a “nullification or 
destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that article.”140 If this threshold is 
met has to be decided on the same standard and burden of proof principles that apply to article 
3 deportation cases, the mutatis mutandis principle141.  
 
Having outlined four forms of unfairness in preceding cases which amounted to a flagrant 
denial of justice,142 the judges raised the question if the admission of evidence obtained by 
torture was a fifth form falling into this category.143 Based on international law and common 
law, they considered that this was the case for the following three reasons:144 
 
 the use of torture evidence destroys the integrity of the trial process and is therefore 
against the rule of law  
 torture evidence is intrinsically unreliable  
 the morally reprehensible conduct of torture should not be indirectly legitimated 
contrary to the legislative intent of art 3  
 
In an obiter dictum, the ECtHR stated that it did not exclude that the use of evidence resulting 
from other, less serious forms of ill-treatment than torture could also amount to a flagrant 
denial of justice.145 
 
With regard to a breach of art 6, the judges emphasised the fundamental difference between 
the admission of torture evidence and other defects in the trial process or the composition of 
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the trial court.146 The court stated that the admission of torture evidence was not only contrary 
to the right to a fair trial under the convention, but also to the right to a fair trial under most 
international covenants like art 15 UNCAT.147  
 
For the foregoing reasons, the admission of torture evidence would “make the whole trial not 
only immoral and illegal, but also entirely unreliable in its outcome”.148 
 
(bb) Evaluation of the General Principles 
 
Overall, the general principles laid down by the ECtHR should be welcomed as they clarify 
why art 6 is relevant in deportation cases.  
 
On an abstract level, by referring to the flagrant denial of justice test as a “stringent test of 
unfairness” the court has confirmed the high threshold of a violation of art 6 in this context, 
which can be seen in line with the underlying intention in its former Soering v the UK 
judgment. The court’s distinction drawn between specific and concrete fair trial complaints on 
the one hand and general and not concrete fair trial complaints on the other hand can provide 
further guidance as to the meaning of the flagrant of denial of justice test.149 
 
On a concrete level, the ECtHR clearly stated that the real risk of the admissibility of torture 
evidence amounts to a flagrant denial of justice and therefore emphasised that torture 
evidence destroys the integrity of the trial process and is therefore against the rule of law. 
Although this clear statement is highly valuable, further clarification is needed concerning the 
question if or under which circumstances diplomatic assurances may remove the real risk of 
using evidence obtained by torture.  
 
Besides, the obiter dictum of the ECtHR, stating that a less serious form than torture evidence 
may also suffice to amount to a flagrant denial of justice, should be considered in the states 
which use the DWA policy. This statement legitimately underlines the will of the ECtHR to 
protect the core values of the Convention in transnational situations.150 
 
In short, although the court’s ruling on art 6 leads to further questions as to the role diplomatic 
assurances can play in removing the real risk of torture admission, it is highly valuable in that 
it has further developed the jurisprudence on the general question of what constitutes a 
“flagrant denial of justice”.151  
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3 Other Convention Rights 
 
Apart from its findings on arts 3 and 6 the ECtHR held that there had been neither a violation 
of art 13 in conjunction with art 3 nor of art 5 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to art 13 of the Convention, the right to an effective remedy, the court dismissed 
Abu Qatada’s complaint that SIAC’s procedure of having heard closed evidence in order to 
establish the effectiveness of assurances by the Jordanian government was incompatible with 
his right to an effective remedy. The judges found that his complaint was linked to his 
substantive complaint under art 3 and therefore admissible.152 However, they stated that there 
was no “enhanced requirement for transparency and procedural fairness where assurances are 
being relied upon”153, thus finding that SIAC’s procedures which included the disclosure of 
secret evidence to special advocates satisfied the requirements of art 13 of the Convention.154 
 
With regard to art 5 of the Convention, the right to liberty and security, the ECtHR held that 
the real risk of being in incommunicando detention for up to fifty days before Abu Qatada’s 
retrial would not constitute a flagrant breach of this article. 155 Regardless of this concrete 
finding, it must be noted that unlike the ECtHR’s approach in Tomic v the UK, the court 
articulated for the first time explicitly that art 5 could apply in expulsion cases.156 Comparable 
to art 6 a flagrant breach of art 5 required a high threshold, which, according to the judges, 
would exemplarily be met in the following cases:157 
 
 if the receiving state arbitrarily detained an applicant for many years without any 
intention of bringing him or her to trial 
 if the applicant was be at risk of being imprisoned for a substantial period in the 
receiving state, having previously been convicted after a flagrantly unfair trial. 
 
Whereas the finding on art 13 is in line with former judgments of the ECtHR and vindicates 
SIAC’s function in the UK158, the court’s general comments on a violation of art 5 can be 
seen as a new approach of the court and require national governments’ consideration for 
future DWA cases159. 
 
V Implications of the ECtHR’s Judgment in Abu Qatada 
 
2012’s decision of the ECtHR in Abu Qatada v the UK shows that the ECtHR is walking a 
difficult tightrope in the field of the interplay of the DWA policy and the Convention: 
whereas they found diplomatic assurances to be a possible means of removing the real risk of 
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ill-treatment regardless of a widespread and routine system of torture in the receiving state, 
the itself system of torture is seen as a relevant factor for finding a breach of art 6.160  
 
A Impact on the Non-Refoulement Principle 
 
This somewhat inconsistent judgment has led to controversial discussions among Member 
States of the European Council and scholars as to whether it has strengthened or weakened the 
non-refoulement principle under the Convention. On the one hand, with regard to art 3 of the 
Convention the non-refoulement principle has been seen as weakened, for the reason that a 
low threshold for assurances now seems to be sufficient to avoid breaching the non-
refoulement principle.161 On the other hand, it has been argued that the scope of the non-
refoulement principle has been extended by this judgment, by the judges including the 
consideration of a risk of a flagrant denial of justice under art 6 of the Convention.162 
 
Both viewpoints can be justified. However, further clarification is required as to what 
threshold is necessary for diplomatic assurances to avoid a breach of art 6 of the Convention. 
If the ECtHR sets the same low threshold for assurances with regard to art 6 as for assurances 
with regard to art 3, “the extension of the non-refoulement to include the risk of a flagrant 
denial of justice will be rather symbolic”.163 Time will tell. 
 
B Shift in Jurisprudence? 
 
With regard to the ECtHR’s rulings both on art 3, finding diplomatic assurances for the first 
time sufficient in terms of removing any real risk of extra-territorial torture, and on art 6, 
finding for the first time, after 22 years, a flagrant denial of justice in a DWA case, it must be 
examined if the aforementioned judgment has contributed to a shift from the former 
jurisprudence to a new one.  
 
Recently, the ECtHR has dealt with some noteworthy cases of extraditions and deportations, 
shedding light on the question whether its decision in Abu Qatada v the UK has marked a shift 
in jurisprudence: 
 
Firstly, in the extradition case Rafaa v France164, the ECtHR explicitly re-approved the 
absolute nature of art 3 in extra-territorial cases in line with the Soering v the UK and Saadi v  
Italy judgments by denying any kind of balancing act.165   
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(2013) 1 at 13; Christopher Michaelsen, above n 161, at 764. 
163 Christopher Michaelsen, above n 161, at 765. 
164 Rafaa v France (25393/10) Section V, ECHR 20 May 2013. 
165 Ibid, at [40]. 
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Secondly, in the deportation case of Labsi v Slovakia166 the court dealt with the interplay of 
the DWA policy and the Convention. In this case, the ECtHR found that the practical 
application of the diplomatic assurances given Algeria to Slovakia were insufficient to 
remove the real risk of ill-treatment in Algeria167, the deportation thus breaching art 3 of the 
Convention.168 By referring to six of the eleven factors listed in Abu Qatada,169 the judges 
identified as a relevant factor that “the assurances given could not be objectively verified 
through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms”.170 Thus, referring to the general 
principles laid down in Abu Qatada, the ECtHR seems to uphold a high threshold concerning 
the sufficiency of a diplomatic assurance for removing the real risk of torture or inhumane 
treatment. 
 
Thirdly, in the extraordinary rendition case of El-Masri v Macedonia171 the ECtHR reiterated 
the finding in Abu Qatada that “a Contracting State would be in violation of art 5 of the 
Convention if it removed an applicant to a State where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant 
breach of that article”.172 This aforementioned case can serve as an example of the tendancy 
of the court to be more likely to find breaches of art 5 and 6 of the Convention in DWA cases 
due to its judgment in Abu Qatada.  
 
Therefore, the judgment of Abu Qatada has rather modified than reformed the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR. The “restrictive stance” of the ECtHR with regard to diplomatic assurances 
continues to be upheld after Abu Qatada v the UK.173 
 
VI Conclusion  
 
The decision of the ECtHR in Abu Qatada is a remarkable judgment concerning the interplay 
of the DWA policy and the Convention and could function as a guideline for governments 
which use the DWA policy, the politicians having to bear in mind the following principles 
laid down by the court: 
 
Firstly, with regard to the absolute prohibition of torture under art 3 of the Convention, the 
court clearly expressed that diplomatic assurances are an “acceptable way to allay the risk of 
torture”.174 It has further determined the prerequisites of a diplomatic assurance to be 
sufficient to remove any real risk of torture or ill-treatment with respect to a person to be 
deported. The court outlined in that decision that the practical application of the diplomatic 
                                                             
166 Labsi v Slovakia (33809/08) Section III, ECHR 15 May 2012 (Labsi v Slovakia). 
167 At [131]. 
168 In addition, the ECtHR found violations of art 13 and 34 of the Convention. 
169 Labsi v Slovakia , above n 166, at [120], including e.g. the monitoring factor but not the factor of the strength 
of bilateral ties between the states. 
170 At [130]. 
171 El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2013) 57 EHRR 25 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) (El-
Masri v Macedonia).  
172 At [239]. 
173 Harlan Grant Cohen, above n 5, at 286. Contrast Marc Bossuyt “The Court of Strasbourg Acting as an 
Asylum Court” (2012) 8 ECLR 203 at 225, who characterises the Abu Qatada judgment concerning the stance 
towards diplomatic assurances as a “striking exception”. 
174 (Case Comment) “Deportation: Deportation of Foreign National – Safety on Return – Othman v United 
Kingdom (8139/09)” (2012) 3 EHRLR 339 at 343. 
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assurance was of particular importance and listed eleven factors “inter alia” to be considered. 
However, further clarification is needed in terms of the weight to be given to the eleven 
factors brought up by the court, particularly with regard to the question in how far a 
monitoring body is mandatory as to the reliability of a diplomatic assurance.   
 
Secondly, the statement that the admission of torture evidence amounts to a flagrant denial of 
justice and therefore breaches art 6 of the Convention is an important clarification concerning 
the flagrant denial of justice test. In how far diplomatic assurances can remove real risks 
which amount to a flagrant denial of justice under relevant relative Convention Rights like art 
5 or 6 is a crucial point, which needs further clarification.  
 
On the whole, the Court’s judgment  is valuable for two reasons:  First of all, it acknowledges 
the DWA policy as a legitimate means of the governments of the Council of Europe to treat 
non-national terrorist suspects. In addition, it sheds light on the question under which 
circumstances deportation on the basis of diplomatic assurances against torture and other 
human rights violations may be permissible under the Convention.  
 
The court thus has both confirmed and partly modified its former jurisprudence and 
legitimately fulfilled its most important function, “the export of sound democratic values to 
all parts of Europe and indeed beyond.”175  
 
To conclude, this judgment taken into account, the counter terrorism means of deporting a 
non-national terrorist suspect with diplomatic assurances seems to be compatible with the 
Convention if the diplomatic assurances given guarantee a sufficient protection of the human 
rights of the transferee,  which due to the uncertain effects of the DWA policy, still has to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
175 David Anderson “Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism without Defeating the Law” (2013) 3 
EHRLR 233 at 246. 
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